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ZERO-TOUCH BOOTSTRAP OF A NETWORK CONNECTED DEVICE 
 







Techniques are presented herein that allow devices to automatically discover the 
correct enterprise wireless network to connect to, and securely onboard against that 
network, without manual provisioning of network information or credentials on the devices. 
This enables secure deployment of devices at scale on enterprise wireless networks.  Minor 
enhancements to Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 are 
described to enable this flow. Unlike Wi-Fi Alliance® Device Provisioning Protocol (DPP), 
the techniques presented herein are lightweight and do not include additional messaging 
overhead between the client device (STA) and Access Point (AP). 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
When network connected devices (e.g., Internet of Things (IoT) devices/Things, 
Collaboration endpoints, etc.) are powered up for the first time, initial onboarding against 
secure wireless networks enforcing authentication (e.g., Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.1x authentication) is generally a laborious manual 
process.  In particular, in the case of 802.1x, a Service Set Identifier (SSID) string and an 
authentication credential must be provisioned on the device. This is a significant “Total 
Cost of Ownership” and “User Experience” issue for even a small number of devices, and 
simply does not scale for large numbers of devices. 
The newly published Wi-Fi Alliance Device Provisioning Protocol (DPP) 
specification attempts to address this problem by defining how a Configurator application 
can enable a device to discover and connect to a Wi-Fi® SSID.  In particular, the Wi-Fi 
Alliance DPP allows for the Configurator application to pass two main categories of 
credentials to the device, namely: 
1. A password or passphrase which can be used to connect to a wireless network 
that is enforcing a password based Authentication and Key Management (AKM) of 
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either Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) or Pre-Shared Key (PSK), and 
advertising this in the Robust Security Network Element (RSNE) Beacon and Probe 
Responses; or 
2. A DPP Connector object which can only be used to connect to a wireless network 
that is enforcing the newly defined "dpp" Authentication and Key Management 
(AKM), which is advertised via a Wi-Fi Alliance Organizationally Unique 
Identifier (OUI) in the RSNE. 
Neither of these approaches are suitable for connection to enterprise networks 
enforcing 802.1X (and therefore rejecting the use of PSK, SAE or a particular "dpp" 
AKM).  The techniques presented herein solve the problem of IoT dynamic provisioning 
in the context of an enterprise environment. 
More specifically, the techniques presented herein define an enhancement to 802.11 
Authentication frames that enables client devices (STAs) to onboard securely against an 
802.11 network that is enforcing 802.1X authentication while providing proof to the STA 
that the network has knowledge of the STA's IDevID public key. Additionally, the 
techniques presented herein protect disclosure of the STA's IDevID public key to rogue 
802.11 networks. 
In accordance with the techniques presented herein, an 802.11 Proof of Knowledge 
(POK) Authentication Algorithm is defined that is used by the STA to verify that an Access 
Point (AP) knows the STA's IDevID public key prior to attempting to connect to the AP. 
This also enables the device to protect its IDevID public key from exposure to rogue 
networks. 
In addition, the techniques presented herein also describe multiple potential 
mechanisms for how Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI) may be 
integrated into the device onboarding flow. The techniques presented herein do not rely on 
DPP, and do not use any of the newly defined messages in DPP. Moreover, the techniques 
presented herein do not rely on the presence or use of a helper application on a mobile 
device or tablet in order to bootstrap the STA, and may be fully integrated into the AP.  
The network enforces an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) method such as EAP-TLS, EAP Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol 
(EAP-TEAP) or any EAP method that establishes a TLS connection. 
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Figures 1A-1C below collectively illustrate a call flow in accordance with 
embodiments presented herein. Details of the call flow shown in Figures 1A-1C are 
described further below. 
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In Step 1 of the call flow, the administrator (admin) provisions the STA IDevID 
public key on the network. The admin may optionally provision the STA Media Access 
Control (MAC) address on the network. This may be done in advance of the STA being 
powered up, for example, when the STA arrives in shipping. This step may be done in 
batch for a large number of expected STAs, and prevents unauthorized STAs from 
automatically joining the network. 
Note that the STA IDevID and, optionally the MAC address, may be provisioned 
on any suitable element in the network. For example, they could be configured on the 
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) server or on the Wireless Local Area 
Network (LAN) Controller (WLC) elements.  In certain implementations, this phase can 
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be performed against authentication databases. The network element can then provide this 
information to the required set of APs when necessary. 
Two embodiments for initial discovery of the AP are described below: 
Embodiment 1: 
In Step 2 of the call flow, the network management system has created a Bloom 
filter containing hashes of the identities of all STAs that it wants to claim. The identities 
are a hash of the STA's IDevID public key. Thus, the Bloom filter bits are set based on 
hashing the STA identities, where the identities are in turn a hash of the STA's public key. 
The Bloom filter bitmap is included in the Beacon frame. 
If the STA sees a Bloom filter match then it knows that the AP is likely attempting 
to claim it. 
Embodiment 2: 
In this embodiment, the Beacon at step 2 of the call flow does not contain a specific 
identifier helping the STA realize that the AP is trying to claim it.  In Step 3 of the call 
flow, the STA sends a Probe Request with a suitable flag set indicating that it wants to 
enroll using POK of its IDevID.   
The “alt Probe Request” section of the call flow provides two options.  In the first 
option, the AP must know the MAC address and map the MAC address to the STAs 
H(public key).  In the second option, the STA simply sends its H(public key) to the AP. 
This avoids the overhead of the network having to be pre-provisioned with the MAC 
address of the STA, or a map of MAC address to public key. There is also no real risk in 
the STA sending its H(public key) to the wrong AP in step 3, as none of these packets are 
encrypted so any rogue AP could sniff the H(public key) in step 4. 
If the AP recognizes the MAC address of the STA, in Step 4 of the call flow, the 
STA sends a Probe Response which includes a hash of the STA's IDevID public key.  In 
an alternative embodiment where the AP does not contain all the IDevID public keys, the 
AP can reply with a 'hold' flag while it retrieves the public key matching the STA MAC 
address, and then send a gratuitous Probe response with the hash. 
At Step 5 of the call flow, the STA knows that the AP wants to claim it as either: 
(i) the AP advertised a Bloom filter with matching bits set, or  
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(ii) (ii) the AP replied with a Probe Response including a hash of the STA's 
public key 
In Step 5, the STA sends an 802.11 Authentication message indicating the 
algorithm type of POK. The STA includes a random nonce in the request. 
On receipt of the message, the AP derives a shared secret via a Diffie Hellman (DH) 
calculation over a finite field (and it could be discrete log or elliptic curve) using the AP's 
private key and the STA's public key. The AP uses the DH shared key and a suitable key 
derivation function to derive shared encryption keys.  
It should be noted that although the IDevID public key is used for the initial 
exchange, the purpose is to create a tunnel with a proof that the infrastructure side has 
knowledge of the device keying material. As such, alternate options (e.g., pre-set PSK, 
other form of public key exchanges, or a suitable Password Authenticated Key Exchange 
(PAKE) algorithm (e.g., PAKE by Juggling (JPAKE) or Secure Remote Password (SRP)) 
may also be applicable. 
The AP uses a suitable encryption algorithm to encrypt the following data: 
- the STA's nonce received in the Authentication message 
- the public key of the EAP server that will be enforcing 802.1x EAP TLS 
authentication 
In Step 6 of the call flow, the AP replies with an 802.11 Authentication message 
indicating the algorithm type of POK. The AP includes its DH public key, the encrypted 
data, and the hash of the STA's public key. 
On receipt of the message, the STA derives the same DH shared secret and 
encryption keys, and verifies that it can decrypt the ciphertext.  The STA verifies that the 
nonce received from the AP matches the nonce it originally sent.  At this point, the STA 
has now verified that the AP knows its public key, and the STA proceeds to connect to the 
AP and initiate the 802.1X authentication.  Steps 7 and 8 of the call flow generally illustrate 
a standard 802.11 Association exchange. 
The STA has also received the public key of the EAP server for the network that 
has completed POK of its IDevID public key. At this stage there is still no secure encrypted 
channel between the STA and the AP.  As such, a malicious attacker could still try to hijack 
the connection.  However, when establishing the 802.1X EAP TLS tunnel, the STA uses 
8
Friel et al.: ZERO-TOUCH BOOTSTRAP OF A NETWORK CONNECTED DEVICE
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2019
 8  5786 
the received EAP server public key to confirm that it is doing the 802.1X handshake with 
the correct network. 
Steps 8 through 14 of the call flow illustrate how the STA uses this to prevent a 
rogue network from hijacking the connection. When the rogue network presents its server 
Certificate in Step 13 of the call flow, the STA compares it with the key received inside 
the POK DH envelop, and drops the connection if the keys do not match. 
Steps 15 through 22 of the call flow illustrate a successful EAP authentication flow. 
When the network presents its server Certificate in Step 19, the STA compares it with the 
key received inside the POK DH envelop, and it confirms a match and completes the 
802.1X TLS handshake in steps 21 and 22 of the call flow. 
At this stage, there are multiple potential integration options possible for 
proceeding with a BRSKI flow whereby the device uses its IDevID to establish trust with 
the local network, enroll and obtain an LDevID in accordance with techniques presented 
herein.  These options include: 
 Option 1: an EAP-BRSKI method could be defined and a tunneled EAP mechanism 
could be used to tunnel the inner EAP-BRSKI method inside the outer EAP TLS 
tunnel. The BRSKI flow would complete inside the context of the EAP 
authentication prior to the STA receiving its IP address. 
 Option 2: EAP BRSKI Type- Length-Values (TLVs) could be defined and these 
TLVs transported inside an outer EAP-TEAP TLS tunnel. The BRSKI flow would 
complete inside the context of the EAP authentication prior to the STA receiving 
its IP address. 
 Option 3: The EAP authentication completes and the BRSKI flow happens at the 
application layer after a Layer 3 connection is established and after the STA has 
received its IP address. 
In each of the above options, once the BRSKI flow is complete and the STA has 
received the local domain trust anchors, the STA substantially immediately tears down the 
connection if it fails to verify the EAP server's identity using those anchors. 
Once BRSKI is complete, the device can enroll to obtain its LDevID, and can use 
its LDevID for all subsequent network accesses and 802.1X authentication. 
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In one example, presented is a method to integrate a mutual recognition and 
network parameter provisioning between an IoT object and an enterprise management 
network over Wi-Fi. POK may be exchanged over Wi-Fi. An AP may provide POK over 
stateless exchanges. The IoT device may automatically choose the correct Wi-Fi network 
to join. This process may be automated (e.g., no manual intervention on individual IoT 
devices is needed as they are installed and powered on). 
As described herein, IoT devices may be installed individually by Operational 
Technology (OT) teams without the need for Information Technology (IT) team 
shadowing. Moreover, these devices may be turned on massively ('building scale'). That is, 
there is no device by device action. The IoT devices may automatically pick the right SSID 
(e.g., in multi-tenant buildings with multiple IoT-friendly SSIDs). Further, IoT devices 
may be provided assurance that the picked network is legitimate (e.g., 'my' network, not 
'neighbor' network or 'rogue' network), regardless of the underlying 802.11 authentication 
method (e.g., works in Open, Pre-Shared Key (PSK), or 802.1X/EAP Wi-Fi networks). 
The recognition choreography described herein allows for integration into a standard 
802.11 network while producing the aforementioned results. 
Provided is a method by which the probe request can result in a comeback 
exchange. By using the comeback mechanism, the AP may collect the information it needs 
to answer a particular question, without mandating the AP to convert the probe exchange 
to a stateful exchange. This structure may be used to allow for many other applications. 
Information Element (IE) bit values may be used which represent "special 
meaning." Because the exchanges are integrated into the standard 802.11 choreography, 
the method described may be integrated into any 802.11 driver or network. Therefore, 
knowledge of the devices (e.g., with BRSKI, IDevID, etc.) may be first installed into the 
infrastructure at any point prior to the IoT device being added to the network. Once the IoT 
device is added to the network, no manual IT intervention is needed. This allows the IoT 
device operator to be an OT person, without IT shadowing. 
The same method may be applied to radio technologies other than 802.11 (e.g., 
Bulk Transmission (BT) and other 802.15.4 techniques), because the existing discovery 
chorography and messages may be reused. 
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This method may be independent of the underlying network authentication method. 
For example, in the case of 802.11, this method may be implemented if the production 
network is Open, PSK or based on 802.1X/EAP authentication.  
There are several possible touchpoints for an IoT onboarding process. The first 
possible touchpoint is network infrastructure (e.g., AP, WLC, etc.). This is simply about 
network configuration (i.e., a "configure once" type of action). The second possible 
touchpoint is an authentication database, and the third possible touchpoint is a further 
management platform (e.g., mesh application and service architecture). The second and 
third possible touchpoints may be mass-configured (upload of batches). Therefore, 
although there is a need for configuration for these items, they represent a low level of 
effort. 
The fourth possible touchpoint is individual IoT devices, one at a time. This 
functions at a different scale from the other possible touchpoints, and this is the problem 
addressed herein. When each individual device needs to be configured, the required effort 
is linear with the number of device. This task is insignificant at small scales (e.g., a house), 
and can sometimes be integrated in the deployment phase. However, at large scales the 
manual configuration and onboarding this possible touchpoint does not work anymore. For 
example, when an entire building is retrofitted, and then power is turned on, this can cause 
thousands of IoT devices to come online at the same time. Alternatively, if the OT and IT 
teams coordinate, this can result in unpredictable (from the IT standpoint) onboarding 
needs and cycles. 
As such, techniques described herein allow IoT devices to automatically onboard 
and join a network without the requirement for operators to configure or manually interact 
with each individual IoT object. 
802.11 is not modified in a fundamental way (i.e., no modification of a protocol). 
802.11 allows some frames to carry specific Information Elements, which value can be set 
to known meanings, or can be set to a value that has a 'special meaning'. The special 
meanings may be defined to support the IoT onboarding use case. As such, 802.11 is not 
being modified, but rather a meaning is being specified for certain frames allowed by 
802.11. The possibilities offered by the probe exchange, are thereby extended by allowing 
additional information to be exchanged while still keeping the fundamental stateless nature 
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of the exchange. The method described herein may be integrated into any existing 802.11 
stack with only minor modifications. 
In summary, techniques are presented herein that allow devices to automatically 
discover the correct enterprise wireless network to connect to, and securely onboard against 
that network, without manual provisioning of network information or credentials on the 
devices. This enables secure deployment of devices at scale on enterprise wireless 
networks.  Minor enhancements to IEEE 802.11 are described to enable this flow. Unlike 
Wi-Fi Alliance DPP, the techniques presented herein are lightweight and do not include 
additional messaging overhead between the STA and AP. 
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